A shallow focus earthquake measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale rocked Marathwada, a backward region in central India, on September 30, 1993 killing about ten thousand persons and injuring thousands more. The immediate Government and public response to the disaster was overwhelming. A significant number of agencies initiated rehabilitation activities while the Government launched a massive rehabilitation program – Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Program (MEERP), with World Bank/IDA assistance. The MEERP laid a high emphasis on community participation and NGO involvement.
The excellent co-ordination between the government and non-government machinery in the relief phase raised hopes for a fruitful collaboration for rehabilitation activities that were to follow. However, the case studies of three NGOs who have tried to collaborate with the government, within the framework of the MEERP, indicate that most of these expectations have been belied during the last two years.
Despite several lacunae in the technical guidelines and a violation of basic norms of equity in program deliverables (by linking household land ownership with entitlement to houses of different sizes, etc.), the MEERP was appreciated by the NGO community for its identification of information transfer, creation of people’s institution and participatory fora as important implementation strategies.
However, the non adoption of many of these strategies, such as not convening many of the consultative committees formed, the lack of staff and resource mobilization for information dissemination, the absence of NGO representatives at any of the policy making levels, etc., give rise to questions regarding the government’s commitment to these participatory processes.
The MEERP has a large, ambitious component for repair and strengthening of over two lakh houses. This has few parallels in the world. This component could not have been implemented through any government machinery, the only feasible mechanism for implementation was through an owner driven program that harnessed local managerial and human resources. The MEERP identified the ground conditions necessary for such a process and information dissemination was given a high priority. The onus for information dissemination was however placed on NGOs and CBOs. This was a clear case of co-optation as none of these agencies had been consulted before project formulation and it was presumed that they would fill the void in the implementation machinery of the government.
Past international experiences indicate that the most viable modes of community participation in government programs are through the involvement of NGOs and CBOs and/or by the creation of grass root, people’s institutions. The latter demands an understanding of social relationships in the community, a work strategy that ensures not only the representation of all view points but also protects the interests of the less privileged, and capacity building that enables people to be effective participants and not mere ‘beneficiaries’. In a region with a long history of feudal oppression and caste based exploitation, capacity building and creation of a level playing field would mean a radical intervention with tremendous potential for social transformations. This would require political will, which given the history of political leadership of the state, was non existent. Thus, the only viable option for ensuring a semblance of community involvement was through the non-governmental organizations. The creation of space for NGOs in the program was an operational necessity.
Agencies such as ASAG and SPARC, have been successful in their attempts to influence government policies from time to time. Their impression from these attempts is that the government is not interested in inputs that mean a delay in program completion or an increase in its workload. Community support (‘people’s choice’) has been used to justify convenient decisions such as the preference to in situ reconstruction over R&S but their demands for policy changes (on the issue of relocation, for instance) have not been accepted.
Assessment of Abilities
The earthquake affected region did not have a significant presence of NGOs prior to the quake. There were no mass based organizations in the core or peripheral regions. Large NGOs/CBOs, operating in neighboring districts of Beed and Aurangabad had established some contacts with smaller groups in the earthquake affected region, but no significant mass based processes were in motion. Thus, as far as the establishment of relationships with the community was considered both the NGOs and the government had similar handicaps. It was therefore ‘wishful thinking’ to a large extent to believe that the NGOs were in a position to take up large scale community mobilization work.
Most of the larger NGOs saw themselves as trainers or innovators who could demonstrate certain processes, which then had to be incorporated in the government program and disseminated in the region. The NGOs on their part, were under the impression that the government system was capable of absorbing its inputs and of disseminating them, but the government system was often not geared for this kind of work.
The experiences of SPARC are typical in this respect. The government felt that it had fulfilled its responsibilities in the field of information transfer and community participation by appointing SPARC as its consultant. It felt that SPARC should fulfill these roles in all the 1,200 affected peripheral villages. The NGO, on the other hand saw itself as an agency that was retained to demonstrate participatory processes, which should be incorporated in the government’s delivery
mechanism.
Space has been created for NGOs in the program in the areas of house construction, information dissemination and awareness generation, in that order of priority. While a good collaborative relationship could still be built on such division of labor, in practice there were several bottlenecks that prevented its evolution. The technical staff of PMU was skeptical of the involvement of NGOs in construction as it threatened established relationships with building contractors. Some NGOs proposed new technical options to which the engineers had a resistance. Personal chemistry between staff of NGOs and the supervisory government engineer also influenced the development of the relationship, as in the case of ML-VS-VP’s intervention. While the district Collector extended all possible help in furthering the collaboration, the agency was constantly harassed by the technical wing of the government through its control over fund release.
Despite substantial rhetoric on creation of facilitating conditions, no special provisions have been made for the involvement of NGOs in construction or R&S activities. For all practical purposes, the NGOs are treated on par with the contractors and have to go through the processes of submission of plans and estimates and inspection of work quality before the release of funds. While larger NGOs with independent sources of finance can buffer their operations during this time consuming process, the smaller ones cannot afford to work under such conditions. ASAG had to withdraw from one village on account of delays in fund release and decided to take up further work with the government, only when a special concession was made and part payment released as an advance.
While it is accepted by the Government that the NGOs do not have a profit motive from construction and It pays them 10% less than the contractors (to account for the latter’s profit margin), the fact that NGOs may have higher overhead costs is not acknowledged.
The task of information dissemination has been passed on to the NGOs by the government. They have. However, not been provided any material or financial support for this activity. The belief that the NGOs have attracted large resources for their work in the area is widely held in the government, and officials think that NGOs should use these funds for information dissemination on government programs. In several instances the NGOs absorbed their professional costs while working with the government and some have not even been paid their direct costs of travel, etc. Thus, NGOs became a cost effective option for several interventions.
The creation of people’s institutions, the avowed objective of several NGOs, was seen as an impediment to the speedy implementation of the program instead of a pre condition for sustainable disaster mitigation efforts in the region. Activities that did not feed into the government’s targets from the MEERP were considered unnecessary and at times, detrimental to the area. NGO capabilities were judged primarily on the basis of the number of houses they were capable of constructing.
While NGO representation was said to be present at decision making fora, very few NGOs knew about these bodies and large NGOs like ASAG and MANAVLOK have rarely been invited to these meeting.
The history of formation of most NGOs indicates that they either have an ‘issue’ focus or a ‘target group’ orientation. The belief in certain ideals and principles is the motive force behind these associations. Any collaboration therefore, has to accept this as a reality and give it due credit. Both agencies have the onus of finding a logical via media that facilitates their interaction. The promotion of local materials or local people’s institutions by NGOs need not therefore be seen as irrational obsessions that prevents future collaboration, but as part of the work principles of the agency. There was no space for accommodating such dissent and uncomfortable issues were never discussed. Communications to resolve these conflict were always one sided and officials chose not to respond to uncomfortable questions raised by agencies such as ASAG.
Learning and Conclusions
The Killari disaster of September 30, 1993 is unique in the history in terms of the humanitarian response that it evoked from the outsiders. The immediate aftermath of the quake saw an unprecedented number of individuals and organizations work with the government in the relief activities that followed. The excellent co-ordination between the government and non government machinery in the relief phase raised hopes for a fruitful collaboration for rehabilitation programme that was to follow. This programme has had an unprecedented potential for a meaningful cooperation between the GO and NGOs. However, most of these expectations have been belied during the last two years.
The World Bank/IDA funded rehabilitation program laid great emphasis on community participation through active collaboration with NGOs and CBOs. Despite several lacunae in the technical guidelines and a violation of basic norms of equity in program deliverables (by linking household land ownership with entitlement to houses of different sizes, etc.), the program was appreciated by the NGO community for its identification of information transfer, creation of
people’s institution and participatory fora as important implementation strategies.
However, the flouting of all norms set for itself by the government, by not convening many of the consultative committees formed, by the lack of staff and resource mobilization for information dissemination, the absence of NGO representatives at any of the policy making levels, etc., lead one to examine the reasons behind the emphasis on community participation in program design and its subversion during implementation. This needs to be seen in the light of socio-political imperatives, which defined the program strategy.
Need for GO-NGO Collaboration
For past several years, policies of the Bretton Woods institutions have been facing increasing criticism as they are seen to destroy the self sufficiency of poorer communities while benefitting a small elite population in the developing countries. The questioning of World Bank support to the Sardar Sarovar Project in western India was in recent memory when the MEERP was being considered for funding support. Under the circumstances, its assertions of commitment to participatory processes may have gone beyond mere rhetoric and become crucial for the acceptability of the proposal, both internally and to the larger world.
The program had a large, ambitious component for repair and strengthening of over two hundred thousand houses. This has few parallels in the world. This component could not have been implemented through any government machinery. The only feasible mechanism for implementation was through an owner driven program that harnessed local managerial and human resources. The MEERP identified the ground conditions necessary for such a process and information dissemination was given a high priority. The onus for information dissemination was however placed on NGOs and CBOs in a rather implicite manner. This was a clear case of co-optation as none of these agencies had been consulted before project formulation and it was presumed that they would fill the void in the implementation machinery of the government.
Past international experiences indicate that the most viable modes of community participation in government programs are through the involvement of NGOs and CBOs or by the creation of grassroot, people’s institutions. The latter demands an understanding of social relationships in the community, a work strategy that ensures not only the representation of all view points but also protects the interests of the less privileged, and capacity building that enables people to be effective participants and not mere ‘beneficiaries’. In a region with a long history of feudal oppression and caste based exploitation, capacity building and creation of a level playing field would mean a radical intervention with great transformation potentials. This would require tremendous political will, which given the history of political leadership of the state, was non existent. Thus, the only viable option for ensuring a semblance of community involvement was through the non governmental organizations. The creation of space (however notional) for NGOs in the program was therefore an operational necessity rather than an innovation in program implementation.
Agencies such as ASAG and SPARC, who have tried to work within the framework of the MEERP with the government, have unsuccessfully attempted to influence restrictive policies from time to time. Their impression from these attempts is that the government is not interested in inputs that mean a delay in program completion or an increase in its workload. Community support (‘people’s choice’) has been used to justify convenient decisions such as the preference to in situ reconstruction over R&S but their demands for policy changes such as changes in the relocation sites, have not been accepted. Thus, ‘community participation’ has also been an effective counter argument to the demands of NGOs (as seen in the case of ASAG’s intervention in R&S).
Creation of Space for Collaboration
Space has been created for NGOs in the program in the areas of house construction. Information dissemination and awareness generation, in that order of priority. While a good collaborative relationship could still be built on such division of labour, in practice there were several bottlenecks that prevented its evolution.
The technical staff of PMU was skeptical of the involvement of NGOs in construction as it threatened established relationships with building contractors. This is very much in line with the stand taken by the government soon after the quake where in the NGOs (not INGOs nor Donor agencies) were told to stick to the distribution of relief supplies or looking after the injured, and keep away from the construction since it is a “technical” matter. Some NGOs proposed new technical options to which the engineers had a resistance. Personal chemistry between staff of NGOs and the supervisory government engineer also influenced the development of the relationship, as in the case of ML- VS-VP’s intervention. While the district Collector extended all possible help in furthering the collaboration, the agency was constantly harassed by the technical wing of the government through its control over fund release.
Despite substantial rhetoric on creation of facilitating conditions, no special provisions have been made for the involvement of NGOs in construction or R&S activities. For all practical purposes, the NGOs are treated on par with the contractors and have to go through the processes of submission of plans and estimates and inspection of work quality before the release of funds. While larger NGOs with independent sources of finance can buffer their operations during this time consuming process, the smaller ones cannot afford to work under such conditions. ASAG had to withdraw from one village in Osmanabad district on account of delays in fund release and decided to take up further work with the government only when a special concession was made and part payment released as an advance. While it is accepted by the Government that the NGOs do not have a profit motive from the construction and it pays them 10% less than to the contractors (to account for the latter’s profit margin), the fact that NGOs may have higher overhead costs is not acknowledged.
The task of information dissemination has been passed on to the NGOs by the government. They have, however, not been provided any material or financial support for this activity. The belief that the NGOs have attracted large resources for their work in the area is widely held in the government, and officials think that NGOs should use these funds for information dissemination on government programs. SPARC took up the task of information transfer with other NGOs and also produced a video, using its own funds, on the basis of an informal understanding that the government would reimburse it for these expenses. The payment was delayed by several months. Similarly, in case of the training of government JEs by ASAG, the agency was not reimbursed for actual travel costs incurred and also had to absorb its professional costs. Thus, the NGOs were also a cost effective option for several interventions.
The creation of people’s institutions, the avowed objective of several NGOs, was seen as an impediment to the speedy implementation of the program instead of a pre condition for sustainable disaster mitigation efforts in the region. Activities that did not feed into the
government’s targets from the MEERP were considered unnecessary and at times, detrimental to the area. NGO capabilities were judged primarily on the basis of the number of houses they were capable of constructing.
